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UNCONDITIONAL COERCION AND
POSITIVE AUTONOMY
RUSSELL CHRISTOPHER*
Forcing or coercing victims to acquiesce to intercourse under adverse
conditions that sufficiently undermine the voluntariness of their consent
typically poses no conceptual problem for the law of rape. For example, a
perpetrator obtaining intercourse by exerting physical force that overpowers
the victim easily qualifies as rape by physical force. But the physical force
need not even be actually exercised. Merely the credible threat of sufficient
physical force, thus causing the fearful victim to submit to intercourse to
avoid the threatened harm, also suffices. Either way, the resulting
intercourse is clearly nonconsensual, unlawful, criminal rape.
When the perpetrator obtains intercourse by a threat, almost invariably
the threat is conditional. The perpetrator threatens the victim with physical
harm if the victim resists, or unless the victim acquiesces to, intercourse.
The proposal conditions the physical harm on the victim’s non-compliance.
That is, the threat is in the form of an “intercourse or else” proposal.
Threats of non-physical harm also may constitute rape—termed rape by
coercion, or in the Model Penal Code’s terms “Gross Sexual Imposition.” 1
Though involving a non-physical harm, the threat is still conditional—
“intercourse or else.” More controversial is whether a proposal that offers a
benefit, rather than threatening a harm, in order to obtain intercourse can be
sufficiently coercive as to negate the victim’s consent and qualify as rape.
But either way, the proposal is still conditional. Rather than “intercourse or
else some type of harm,” the proposal is “intercourse or else no benefit.”
That is, the perpetrator conditions receipt of the benefit on the victim’s
compliance by engaging in intercourse.
But what if the harm or threat is unconditional? Can an unconditional
harm or threat even be understood as coercive? If the harm or threatened
harm occurs unconditionally—regardless of whether the victim engages in
intercourse or not—how can the victim be said to have been coerced? If the
* Professor of Law, the University of Tulsa College of Law. I thank the conference
panelists, participants, and editors at the Law Review for their helpful comments and
suggestions.
1. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (explaining the sexual
offense as compelling submission to intercourse “by any threat that would prevent resistance
by a [victim] of ordinary resolution”).
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harm occurs whether the victim engages in intercourse or not, can the harm
have coerced or induced or caused the intercourse? If the victim does
engage in intercourse is it thus necessarily consensual?
This Essay addresses the special challenge that a perpetrator’s use of
unconditional harm or unconditional threatened harm as the means to obtain
a victim’s acquiescence to intercourse poses for the law of rape. It first
illustrates the conceptual difficulty by considering a case involving a
defendant obtaining intercourse under the most brutal and horrific
conditions imaginable. Though we might all find the defendant
blameworthy and deserving the most severe punishment, explaining exactly
how the defendant is legally guilty is less clear. The victim’s acquiescence
to intercourse in the face of these horrific circumstances—precisely because
they are unconditional—renders it surprisingly difficult to explain conduct
we intuitively feel must be non-consensual on the part of the victim.
After exploring whether this case and the special problem of
unconditional harm or threatened harm may be explained under the various
types of rape, the Essay considers the distinction between positive and
negative sexual autonomy. 2 It canvases the extent to which our law seeks
not merely to protect our negative autonomy—freedom from unwanted
intercourse—but also strives to protect our positive sexual autonomy—
freedom to engage in wanted intercourse. Our difficulty in crafting a
satisfactory account of unconditional harm or threatened harm may be due
to the interest accorded to a victim’s positive autonomy. If we take positive
autonomy seriously, unconditional harm or threatened harm poses a
2. Negative sexual autonomy is freedom from unwanted sexual intercourse; positive
sexual autonomy is freedom to engage in wanted sexual intercourse. Donald Dripps, a fellow
symposium panelist who writes on consent in this issue, see Donald A. Dripps, Due Process
Overbreadth? The Void for Vagueness Doctrine, Fundamental Rights, and the Brewing
Storm Over Undefined Consent in Sexual Assault Statutes, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 121 (2020), is
perhaps the first to articulate that distinction. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on
the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1780, 1785 (1992). For other accounts recognizing the distinction, see JOAN
MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE?: ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING WOMEN’S CONSENT
SERIOUSLY 111–12 (2005); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF THE LAW x (1998) (“Respect for autonomy requires
protecting our freedom to refuse sexual contact [negative autonomy], but it also requires
protecting our freedom to seek emotional intimacy and sexual fulfillment with willing
partners [positive autonomy].”); ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 125
(2003) (stressing the importance of both dimensions of sexual autonomy—positive and
negative—be respected and facilitated).
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challenge. Instead, if our sole concern is protection of negative autonomy,
the problem is defanged. Thus, the problem of unconditional harm or
threatened harm forces us to grapple with striking the right balance between
protecting our positive and negative sexual autonomy, between punishing
culpable offenders and not further victimizing victims.
I. The Challenge of California v. Hooker
To illustrate acquiescence to intercourse obtained by unconditional harm
or coercion, let us consider California v. Hooker.3 The case features
intercourse under unimaginably horrific and repugnant circumstances that
would seemingly pose no problems in analyzing the victim’s lack of
consent and concluding that the perpetrator was guilty of rape. Despite our
intuitions that the perpetrator surely deserves the most severe punishment
available, the case does not easily fit within existing approaches to the law
of rape.
In Hooker, a husband and wife kidnapped the adult victim at knifepoint
and held her captive.4 The victim was held naked, bound, gagged,
blindfolded, and chained to a bed. 5 After several years of continuing
captivity, the husband began having intercourse with the victim. 6
Undoubtedly, one would believe the horrendous conditions sufficiently
undermined the victim’s capacity to consent. While the court did in fact
conclude that the victim’s capacity to consent was undermined, it did so in
a way different from how we normally think about force and threats
undermining consent.7
Rape by physical force generally occurs in either (or both) of two ways:
when the perpetrator exerts extrinsic force that overpowers an unwilling
victim who is powerless to prevent the intercourse or when the perpetrator
obtains intercourse with the victim by threatening extrinsic force.8 Under
the latter type, the perpetrator does not literally overpower the victim, but
instead the victim reluctantly acquiesces via the coercion of the threat.
Typically threats of force are conditional in nature. The recipient will be
3. 244 Cal. Rptr. 337 (Ct. App. 1988) (depublished).
4. Id. at 338–39.
5. Id. at 339.
6. Id. at 340.
7. See id. at 345–46.
8. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 33.04[B][1][d], at 577
(6th ed. 2012) (“Forcible rape prosecutions may be based on a threat of serious force rather
than its infliction.”).
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physically harmed only on the condition that they do not submit to
intercourse. If they do submit, they will not be harmed. The force is
conditioned on noncompliance with the demand of intercourse.
But the rape in Hooker transpired through neither of these means. The
husband did not obtain intercourse with the victim through extrinsic force
that overpowered her; she was not physically helpless to prevent the
intercourse. Nor did the husband obtain intercourse via a conditional threat.
Either there was no threat, or the threat was unconditional. The horrific
conditions of the victim’s captivity were imposed on her regardless of
whether she complied with any demands or submitted to intercourse. The
husband never uttered an “intercourse or else . . .” threat. He did not
threaten to make the conditions of the victim’s captivity any worse if the
victim did not submit to intercourse. Nor was there any evidence of an
implicit or unspoken threat if the victim did not engage in intercourse. 9
Another unusual feature of the case is that the victim factually consented
to intercourse with the husband. 10 As Peter Westen explains, by rendering
the victim a captive, the husband caused the victim “to acquiesce to sexual
intercourse by unconditionally placing her in a position in which she
preferred captivity with sexual intercourse to captivity without sexual
intercourse[.]”11 That is, the victim did not reluctantly submit to intercourse
but rather affirmatively wanted, desired, and wished to engage in
intercourse. The court held, and Westen agreed, that despite the victim
desiring to engage in the intercourse, it was nonetheless rape.12 The victim’s
factual consent was not legal consent. It was not legal consent in their view
because the victim’s factual consent was given when she was in a
sufficiently adverse position. 13
These three unusual features in Hooker—that there was factual consent
by the victim, that the perpetrator did not exert extrinsic physical force to
obtain intercourse, and that the perpetrator did not employ a conditional
threat to coerce intercourse—make it conceptually challenging to satisfy the
elements of rape by physical force. But these three features are easily
accommodated by approaches to other types of rape: statutory rape or
9. For the purposes of our analysis, let us assume that the victim did not believe that
there was an implicit threat.
10. PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT : THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF
CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 184–85 (2004).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 184–85.
13. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/8

2020]

UNCONDITIONAL COERCION & POSITIVE AUTONOMY

163

intercourse with an intoxicated victim. 14 In those types of rape, victims do
not merely acquiesce but may affirmatively desire to engage in intercourse,
but do so under conditions or circumstances that undermine consent. 15 Just
as in Hooker, the victim prefers being intoxicated or underage with sexual
intercourse to intoxication or being underage without intercourse. That a
victim might factually consent to intercourse under those conditions or
circumstances nonetheless does not constitute legal consent. Being
intoxicated or underage renders one legally incapable of giving or
incompetent to consent. 16
But what might make the analysis in Hooker still different is the duration
or pervasiveness of the condition or circumstances precluding legal consent.
It is one thing for the law to speak, in a sense, to the intoxicated person as
follows: “We understand that you want to have intercourse now while you
are intoxicated, but we think that is an unwise choice and one that you
might regret when sober.” In protecting the victim’s negative autonomy—
freedom from unwanted intercourse—the harm to the victim’s positive
autonomy is minimal. The victim need only wait until the next day to attain
sobriety. Even for an underage person wanting to engage in intercourse, the
constraint on positive autonomy is arguably not too oppressive. A fifteenyear-old may only have to wait a year to attain the age of consent. 17 But the
victim in the Hooker case may be different.
Unlike an intoxicated or underage victim, the kidnapping victim was
held captive for three years before she expressed a preference for
intercourse. True, some thirteen-year-olds might wish to engage in
intercourse and have to similarly wait three years before they can legally
consent. But there is still a difference between the thirteen-year-old and the
Hooker victim. The duration of the bar to the underage person’s legal
capacity to consent is limited and certain. The bar to the victim in Hooker is
open-ended and potentially indefinite. Moreover, the bar might serve a
14. See, e.g., MCGREGOR, supra note 2, at 141 (“Consent is undermined by one of two
general kinds of infelicities: first, internal conditions that affect the actor’s capacity to
consent—being too young, asleep, unconscious, drunk, or high on drugs.”).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 224–25 (“If we say that minors are unable to give
transformative consent while they are minors, we do not preclude sexual experience over the
course of their lives. Minors get older. By contrast, to say that retarded females cannot give
transformative consent is to deny them permanently the opportunity to legitimately
experience intimacy and sexual pleasure. The cost of zealously protecting their negative
autonomy is very high indeed.”) (footnote omitted).
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greater hardship on adult victims compared to underage victims. Adult
victims have already attained the legal age of consent and are accustomed
to enjoying the capacity of legal consent. In contrast, underage victims are
not barred from something that they have previously enjoyed or exercised.
Because of the open-ended and potentially life-long conditions rendering
the Hooker victim incapable of legal consent, perhaps the better type of
rape through which to understand Hooker is intercourse with a mentally
disabled person. The mentally disabled are generally considered legally
incapable of consent and thus intercourse with them is criminalized as
rape.18 And unlike being intoxicated or underage, the basis for the
incompetence to legally consent is open-ended and potentially indefinite, as
with the victim in Hooker. 19 Conceptually, the victim in Hooker might be
more appropriately characterized as having a mental disability of sorts and
was thus legally incapable of consenting, thereby rendering the intercourse
rape. Rather than the mental disability being caused by internal processes in
the brain, the mental disability of the victim in Hooker is caused by external
circumstances—a sort of environmental or circumstantial mental disability.
But precisely because of the open-ended and potentially indefinite
constraint on the capacity to consent, some courts and commentators
suggest that mental disability should not bar the legal capacity to consent. 20
As Alan Wertheimer argues, to declare that the mentally ill “cannot give
transformative consent is to deny them permanently the opportunity to

18. See K.H. Larsen, Annotation, Rape or Similar Offense Based on Intercourse with
Woman Who Is Allegedly Mentally Deficient, 31 A.L.R.3d 1227 (1970).
19. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Adkins v. Virginia, 457 S.E.2d 382, 387 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (expressing
concern that statutes protecting the mentally disabled from exploitation “must not be
interpreted and applied in a manner that . . . would prohibit all mentally impaired or retarded
persons from engaging in consensual sexual intercourse without having their partners
commit a felony”) (citing New Jersey v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 604 (N.J. 1991) (stressing
“the importance of according the mentally handicapped their fundamental rights”));
MCGREGOR, supra note 2, at 155 (“Would we want to say that all mentally ill people cannot
consent to sex? Wouldn’t such a sweeping rule unjustifiably deny all those with mental
retardation and mental[] illness the right to sexual autonomy by not permitting them to
affirmatively choose to have a sexual relationship?”); WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 224
(“[W]e have reason to be concerned to facilitate the positive autonomy of the retarded as
well as to protect their negative autonomy.”); see also Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape,
and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 322 (“[M]ost mentally retarded
individuals have the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse but . . . they should also be
protected from harm.”).
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legitimately experience intimacy and sexual pleasure. The cost of zealously
protecting their negative autonomy is very high indeed.”21
The same consideration of the positive autonomy of the mentally
disabled would equally apply to the victim in Hooker. Because declaring
the victim in Hooker incapable of legal consent would create a permanent
ban on her enjoying the fundamental right to and “important human good”
of intercourse, 22 perhaps we should not declare the victim in Hooker legally
incapable of consent. While doing so would protect her negative autonomy,
it might too greatly constrain her positive autonomy.
One might object that three years is too short a period of time before
foregoing (or relaxing) the protection of our negative autonomy. But after
three years, it perhaps appeared to the victim in Hooker that her captivity
would continue indefinitely. So, the question becomes at what point should
the protection of an individual’s negative autonomy be relaxed? While there
is no clear number of years or days where the protection of negative
autonomy disappears, ignoring the importance of positive autonomy will
eventually cause a harm of its own. In fact, at some point, the interest in
positive autonomy may well outweigh our interest in negative autonomy. 23
Ultimately, it is at that point where factual consent under adverse conditions
that have become institutionalized or normalized may constitute legal
consent.
II. Balancing Negative and Positive Autonomy
There still may be strong objections that our negative autonomy is an
absolute value, too important to be subjected to a balancing test against
positive autonomy. 24 However, our present laws reflect a balance between
21. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 225 (footnote omitted).
22. MCGREGOR, supra note 2, at 113; accord SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 277 (“[T]he
right to seek intimacy is important, extremely so.”); see also id. at 163 (“[S]exual fulfillment
is a legitimate and valued goal of marriage and other ongoing, intimate relationships.”).
23. SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 237 (acknowledging that overprotection of negative
autonomy may impair our positive autonomy—it will “bear too heavily on legitimate claims
to privacy and sexual freedom”); id. at 272 (noting that sufficient protection of negative
autonomy by a verbal consent rule may nonetheless impose “the cost [on our positive
autonomy] of imposing a degree of formality and artificiality on human interactions in
which spontaneity is especially important”); id. at 277 (supplying several examples where
overprotection of negative autonomy impermissibly undermined positive autonomy).
24. Negative autonomy might well be the comparatively greater concern of the criminal
law. MCGREGOR, supra note 2, at 112 (“The criminal law exists to protect negative sexual
autonomy . . . .”). Nonetheless, positive autonomy should be promoted or not interfered with
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the two forms of sexual autonomy. 25 For example, we do not criminalize all
intercourse undertaken when merely some alcohol has been consumed. But
if negative autonomy were our only concern, then a rule criminalizing such
conduct would provide better protection. Instead, we only criminalize
intercourse when the victim is sufficiently intoxicated. True, such a rule
weakens the protection of our negative autonomy as compared to an
absolute ban on intercourse after even slight consumption of alcohol, but
we view our present rule as preferable because it gives due regard for our
positive autonomy. To illustrate this rule, consider Wertheimer’s following
thought experiment:26 We can go to either of two different parties, each of
which has different rules pertaining to alcohol and intercourse. Party 1
forbids any party guest engaging in intercourse that night after touching
even a drop of alcohol. Party 2 comports with our present rule that allows
consent to intercourse if the victim is not sufficiently intoxicated.
Wertheimer conjectures, and reports anecdotal evidence, that few would
prefer attending Party 1.27
Statutory rape law also reflects a balance between the two types of
autonomy. Given that some studies suggest that adolescent brains do not
become fully mature until the age of twenty-five, 28 if we were only
interested in protecting negative autonomy, we might extend the protection
of our statutory rape laws to the age of twenty-five. That we do not seek
such maximal protection of our negative autonomy suggests that positive
autonomy also has some value. On that basis, the optimal age of consent
reflects an appropriate balance between protecting our negative and positive
autonomy.
Even the ethical regulation of lawyers and clients having intercourse
with each other reflects the attempt to strike the right balance between the
unless it would violate someone’s negative autonomy. Id. at 111–12 (“[P]ositive liberties are
limited only by the sovereign right of others to refuse consent. Arguably, the state should not
block the pursuit of positive sexual autonomy except where the exercising of power violates
another’s negative sexual autonomy.”).
25. SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 15 (“A workable notion of sexual autonomy
[incorporating both positive and negative dimensions] appears to require compromises and
‘balancing’ . . . .”).
26. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 252.
27. Id. at 252–53.
28. Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC
DISEASE & TREATMENT 449, 451 (2013), https://doi.org/10.2147/NDT.S39776 (“It is well
established that the brain undergoes a ‘rewiring’ process that is not complete until
approximately 25 years of age.”) (footnote omitted).
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two types of autonomy. 29 If we were only concerned with protecting
clients’ negative sexual autonomy, we might have a rule absolutely
prohibiting intercourse with a client. Because this would too greatly
infringe our positive autonomy, we allow it under some circumstances.
First, while lawyers must not commence a sexual relationship with a preexisting client, lawyers may commence a representation of a client with
whom the lawyer has a pre-existing (and still ongoing) sexual
relationship. 30 Second, lawyers in a firm may commence sexual
relationships with their law partners’ clients. 31 Third, when the client is an
organization, lawyers may commence sexual relationships with some
employees of that organizational client. 32 Despite diminishing the
protection of clients’ negative autonomy, these rules advance both clients’
and lawyers’ positive autonomy. That we do not adopt an absolute rule
banning all of those interactions suggests that the law does seek to protect
and advance positive autonomy as well. The law strives to attain the
optimal balance between negative and positive autonomy.
Similarly, most employers do not prohibit any and all intercourse
between employees. Though such a rule would surely protect negative
autonomy, it would too greatly infringe upon those employees’ positive
autonomy. This is especially true given the high incidence of marriages and
committed relationships resulting from people that meet in the workplace. 33
Striving to strike the right balance between negative and positive autonomy,
it is more typical that relationships between superiors and subordinates are
prohibited. 34 But intercourse between employees at the same level and
29. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(j) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“A lawyer
shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed
between them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced.”).
30. Id.
31. Id. r. 1.8(k) (exempting Rule 1.8(j) from the general rule imputing conflicts of any
lawyer in a firm to all lawyers in that firm).
32. See id. r. 1.8(j) cmt. [19] (“When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of the
Rule prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside or outside counsel) from having
a sexual relationship with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or
regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the organization’s legal matters.”).
33. Lindsay Dodgson, The Psychological Reasons Why You Fall in Love with Your
Colleagues, BUS. INSIDER (May 29, 2018, 9:17 AM), https://www.businessinsider.
com/psychology-of-office-romances-2018-5 (citing a study that shows “22% of people meet
their actual romantic partner at work”).
34. See, e.g., Shelley Frost, Romantic Relationships in the Workplace, CHRON: SMALL
BUS., https://smallbusiness.chron.com/romantic-relationships-workplace-11804.html (last
visited May 13, 2020) (noting that supervisor-subordinate relationships pose “the biggest
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presumably between those employees who are married to each other
(regardless of their respective levels) is permitted.
Because rape law and our regulation of intercourse recognizes the value
of positive autonomy and attempts to maintain the appropriate balance
between negative and positive autonomy, what constitutes consent is itself a
balance between negative and positive autonomy. That a victim says “Yes”
to the prospect of intercourse or affirmatively desires it does not necessarily
constitute legal consent. A person’s factual consent to intercourse if
underage or sufficiently intoxicated, for example, does not constitute legal
consent.35 Considerations of negative autonomy outweigh an interest in
positive autonomy and bar a person’s factual consent from being legal
consent. In these cases, protecting negative autonomy transforms factual
consent into legal non-consent.
Something similarly transformative may occur when our interest in
positive autonomy becomes sufficiently high or outweighs negative
autonomy. When negative autonomy outweighs positive autonomy, factual
consent may nonetheless be legal non-consent. But when positive autonomy
outweighs negative, what would be legal non-consent from the perspective
of negative autonomy may well be legal consent.
III. Less Conventional Explanations of Hooker
The conventional types of rape—by physical force, by conditional threat
of physical force, and intercourse with a person legally incompetent to
consent—fail to explain Hooker. This section attempts to understand
Hooker through less conventional approaches.
First, let us consider intercourse under dire circumstances or
socioeconomic adversity. For example, suppose that “B’s child will die
unless she receives expensive surgery for which the state will not pay. A, a
millionaire proposes to pay for the surgery if B will agree to become his
mistress.”36 We might say that the dire circumstances compel B to
acquiesce, thereby undermining the voluntariness of her consent. Similarly,
on that basis, the victim in Hooker also does not consent.
There are two problems in explaining Hooker through the above “dire
circumstances” approach. First, the above example is inapposite to Hooker.
potential conflict” but that same-level relationships have “less potential for conflict or
feelings of unfair treatment with other employees”).
35. See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
36. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 128.
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The above example involves a conditional proposal—A will pay for the
surgery to B’s child and prevent B’s death only on the condition that B
becomes A’s mistress. However, as discussed above, the coercion in
Hooker is unconditional. One might claim that it is the dire circumstances
and not the conditional proposal that compels B’s acquiescence. But the
dire circumstances alone—if there were no proposal from A to pay for B’s
child’s surgery and save B’s life—would surely not compel B to do
anything with A.
Second, a number of commentators find it at least plausible that dire
circumstances and adverse or unjust social circumstances that would
normally obviate voluntary consent may nevertheless allow a finding of
consent so as to protect positive autonomy. 37 The choices such victims
make should be respected. Denying the victim’s choice as valid and
consensual might well make the victim’s already difficult plight even
worse. 38 Similarly, we might well view the victim in Hooker as consenting.
That protects her positive autonomy and does not make her already horrific
plight any worse. As a result, the dire circumstances approach also does not
supply a clear basis to explain Hooker.
Another less conventional approach is from Peter Westen. Westen
contrasts wrongful threats (which are conditional in nature) from
“‘wrongful oppression’, which is unconditional in nature.” 39 Westen
provides the following account:
‘[W]rongful oppression’ exerts pressure upon S, not by causing S
to believe that she can prevent her position from worsening by
acquiescing to x, but rather by causing S to believe that her
position is such that given the circumstances in which she finds
herself, engaging in x is preferable to the alternative of forgoing
x.40

37. SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 107; WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 128 (“We may
grant that poor women do not have enough options and that society has been unjust to them
in not extending more options, while nonetheless respecting and honoring the choices they
actually make in reduced circumstances.”) (quoting Martha C. Nussbaum, “Whether from
Reason or Prejudice”: Taking Money for Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693, 721
(1998)).
38. SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 107.
39. WESTEN, supra note 10, at 184.
40. Id.
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A victim’s (or S’s) consent to intercourse is negated by wrongful
oppression when a perpetrator reduces S to a worse position than the
criminal offense of rape “allows a person to reduce S as a basis for inducing
her to acquiesce to x . . . [and] S prefers to acquiesce to x rather than not.” 41
Westen applies this to Hooker as follows:
[The defendant caused the victim] to acquiesce to sexual
intercourse by unconditionally placing her in a position in which
she preferred captivity with sexual intercourse to captivity
without sexual intercourse—a position that was worse than the
position in which the California offense of rape allows a man to
place a woman as a basis upon which to elicit acquiescence to
sexual intercourse with himself or another. 42
Though not relying on conditional coercion, Westen’s approach would
suffer from the other problems besetting the dire circumstances approach. It
would insufficiently value and protect the victim’s positive autonomy. As
Schulhofer notes, denying the victim’s choice under dire circumstances as
valid and consensual may make the victim’s horrific plight even worse. 43 It
may victimize victims twice—first by the horrific conditions and then
second by effectively eliminating the means by which they choose to
ameliorate their horrific conditions.
Yet another less conventional approach is the view that consensual
intercourse between men and women is nearly impossible. Catharine
MacKinnon and others argue that the combined conditions of gender
discrimination and socioeconomic inequities in our present society may
preclude the possibility of consent between men and women. 44 Under this
41. Id.
42. Id. at 185.
43. SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 107.
44. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 174 (1989)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY] (“[R]ape is defined as distinct from intercourse,
while for women it is difficult to distinguish the two under conditions of male dominance.”)
(footnote omitted); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 86–87 (1987) (“[Conventionally, we] distinguish sharply between rape . . .
and intercourse . . .; sexual harassment . . . and normal, ordinary sexual initiation . . . . What
women experience does not so clearly distinguish the normal, everyday things from those
abuses from which they have been defined by distinction. . . . [S]exuality in exactly these
normal forms often does violate us.”); Robin West, A Comment on Consent, Sex, and Rape,
2 LEGAL THEORY 233, 241 (1996) (“[MacKinnon expresses concern that] large categories of
women (wives, girlfriends, prostitutes, promiscuous girls, women of color, women who
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view, the privileged position of men and the inequitable position of women
renders intercourse with men inherently coercive to women. These scholars
maintain that women simply cannot, or generally do not, genuinely consent
to intercourse with men. 45 Even in a marriage, or perhaps especially within
a marriage, women cannot genuinely consent to intercourse with men. To
these scholars, the institution of marriage is viewed as essentially a
legalized form of coercive prostitution. Therefore, because of economic and
gender inequities in our society, women are forced to marry in order to
secure economic security. Wives trade intercourse for economic security;
husbands trade economic security for intercourse. 46
If nearly all intercourse between men and women is nonconsensual due
to gender and economic inequities, then a fortiori the intercourse in Hooker
between kidnapper and captive is nonconsensual. Hooker is merely an
extreme example of the inherently coercive relations between men and
women throughout our society, even in seemingly loving and committed
marriages and long-term relationships. If true, then the inherent
coerciveness of heterosexuality in our society does provide a basis to
explain the result in Hooker.
To an even greater degree than Westen’s account, the above approach of
MacKinnon and others perhaps too greatly diminishes our positive
autonomy. True, by treating nearly all heterosexual intercourse as
nonconsensual and thus rape, it protects our negative autonomy exceedingly
well. But it not only violates our positive autonomy, it nearly completely
eliminates it.

don’t fight back, women who are sexually desirable) are depicted and understood as having,
in effect, no right or entitlement to the physical security or integrity of their own bodies
against violent sexual assault.”); see also id. at 242 (“Catharine MacKinnon’s most powerful
and most important insight, to date, is simply that violence and the threat of it, in such a
world [i.e., our world], underscore all heterosexuality; violence becomes central to the
nature of sex.”).
45. ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 125–26 (1987) (“[M]en have social, economic,
political, and physical power over women[, and] all men have some kinds of power over all
women . . . .”); MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 44, at 173 (viewing “sexuality as
a social sphere of male power to which forced sex is paradigmatic”).
46. Cf. David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 445 (2000) (“Of
course, men often ‘use their economic superiority to gain sexual advantages,’ but women
often use their sexual superiority to gain economic advantages. So who is the extortionist?”).
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Conclusion
As opposed to conditional coercion, the unconditional imposition of
horrific circumstances poses a difficult conceptual challenge for modern
understandings of consent and the law of rape. Though imposition of
unconditional coercion might intuitively demand that we regard the
victim’s consent negated and the perpetrator be punished, conventional
approaches to the law of rape, premised on coercion being conditional,
struggle to establish any resulting intercourse as nonconsensual. Is
conditionality inherent in the very nature of coercion? If the horrific
circumstances are to be imposed regardless of whether the victim
acquiesces to intercourse, in what way did the horrific circumstances induce
the acquiescence? Some less conventional approaches perhaps can account
for unconditional coercion negating consent. But they may do so at too
great a cost. While protecting our negative autonomy, they violate our
positive autonomy. Denying a victim’s choice as valid and consensual
when made under unconditional horrific circumstances may make the
victim’s already difficult plight even worse. By perhaps precluding victims’
only way to somewhat ameliorate the horrific circumstances, the victims
may be victimized twice—first by the perpetrator’s imposition of horrific
circumstances and second by the diminution of their positive autonomy.
But recognizing and honoring victims’ positive autonomy is intuitively
unpalatable by allowing very culpable and blameworthy rapists to go
unpunished. How the law of rape should treat unconditional coercion poses
a dilemma of difficult trade-offs between negative and positive autonomy
as well as between giving culpable rapists their just deserts and victims’
rights. Should we let the blameworthy rapist go unpunished so as to not
further victimize the victim? Or should we sacrifice the victim’s interests so
as to give culpable rapists their just deserts?
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